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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2271 
___________ 
 
ROHAN GEORGE RAMGEET WILSON, 
 
Petitioner  
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY; GARY MEAD, as Executive Associate Director, Enforcement and Removal 
Operations; JOHN TSOUKARIS, as Acting Director, Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, Newark, NJ Field Office, 
 
Respondents 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A042-252-863) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo A. Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 26, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 27, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
Rohan Ramgeet Wilson, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) final order of removal.  For the following reasons, 
we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Wilson, a native of Jamaica, was born on October 6, 1976.  He became a lawful 
permanent resident upon his admission to the United States as an immigrant in August 
1989.  In October 2011, the Government issued a Notice to Appear charging him with 
removal pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on his 1997 conviction for murder. 
 At a removal hearing in December 2011, Wilson claimed that he was not subject 
to removal because he had derived United States citizenship through his mother’s 
naturalization in May 1995.  The Government contested the citizenship claim, explaining 
that, because Wilson had already turned eighteen at the time his mother naturalized, he 
did not derive citizenship from her under the applicable statute, former INA § 321(a)(4).  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4) (repealed) (providing that a child born outside of the country 
who is residing in the United States can become a citizen when a parent naturalizes as 
long as “such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen 
years”).  The Immigration Judge (IJ) continued the proceedings in order to allow Wilson 
an opportunity to submit evidence in support of his citizenship claim. 
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When the parties reconvened in January 2012, Wilson directed the IJ to three 
documents in his alien file (A-file) that, in his view, demonstrated his citizenship:  a data 
sheet titled “Inmate Load Data,” one titled “Security/Designation,” and a document titled 
“Inmate Information Sheet,” all of which contained entries of “United States of America” 
or “United States” in the fields designated for citizenship.  (AR000219-221.)  The IJ 
noted that the documents appeared to be records relating to Wilson’s incarceration for the 
murder conviction, and found that they did not demonstrate that he was an American 
citizen; rather, they demonstrated that, “[a]t best, the custodial authorities believed that 
[he was] a citizen of the United States when [he was] incarcerated.”  (AR000183.)  The IJ 
further found that, as a matter of law, Wilson did not derive citizenship through his 
mother’s naturalization because he was eighteen years old when his mother naturalized in 
May 1995.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4).  Accordingly, the IJ determined that Wilson was 
not an American citizen and was removable as charged. 
Wilson appealed to the BIA, arguing that:  (1) the IJ violated his due process rights 
by failing to meaningfully consider the documents in his A-file that – according to 
Wilson – proved his citizenship; (2) he was entitled to derivative citizenship under former 
INA § 321(a)(4) through his mother’s naturalization because he was seventeen, and thus 
“under the age of eighteen years,” at the time his mother applied for naturalization; and 
(3) the agency lacked the authority to adjudicate his citizenship claim.  In a decision 
dated April 26, 2012, the BIA rejected Wilson’s arguments and dismissed the appeal.  
This petition for review followed. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
When, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, rather than a summary 
affirmance, we review its decision, not that of the IJ.”  Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 
483 (3d Cir. 2012).  We review factual findings for substantial evidence, while legal 
determinations are reviewed de novo.  Id. 
Wilson first argues that the BIA erred in denying his claim that the IJ had violated 
his due process rights by failing to meaningfully consider the three documents in his A-
file that, in his view, prove his citizenship.  Wilson further argues that the BIA “plainly 
ignored” his A-file when it considered his appeal.  We see no error.  First, the record 
reflects that the IJ carefully reviewed the three documents, and specifically stated on the 
record that they did not support Wilson’s citizenship claim.  Insofar as Wilson disputes 
the IJ’s interpretation of these documents, we note that substantial evidence supports the 
IJ’s finding that they did not demonstrate that Wilson was an American citizen.  Lastly, 
although Wilson complains that the BIA did not review the referenced documents on 
appeal, it is evident from the Board’s decision that it did.  See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 
241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every 
contention.  What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its 
decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 
thought and not merely reacted.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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 Next, Wilson claims that the agency erred in determining that he did not acquire 
derivative citizenship under former INA § 321 through the naturalization of his mother.  
Pursuant to INA § 321, a child born outside of the country who is residing in the United 
States can become a citizen when a parent naturalizes as long as “such naturalization 
takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years.”1
 Wilson also argues that, contrary to the agency’s contention, he was not required 
to provide a certificate of naturalization or a passport from the United States government 
in order to prove that he is a citizen.  We agree with Wilson that an alien acquires 
  8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4) 
(repealed).  Wilson recognizes that he did not meet the literal terms of the statute because 
he turned eighteen before his mother was naturalized in 1995.  Nonetheless, he argues 
that he should be entitled to derivative citizenship because he was seventeen, and thus 
“under the age of eighteen years,” at the time she applied for naturalization.  Former 
§ 321(a)(4) plainly requires that a child born outside of the United States to alien parents 
must be under eighteen years of age at the time his parent naturalizes in order to derive 
citizenship on that basis.  See Chavarria-Calix v. Att’y Gen., 2013 WL 203393, at *3 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (not precedential).  Therefore, this argument fails. 
                                              
1 Former § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1432, was repealed by the Child Citizenship Act of 
2000 (“CCA”), Pub. L. No. 106-395, which took effect on February 27, 2001.  The CCA 
liberalized the conditions for derivative citizenship of alien children of naturalized 
parents, but it is not retroactive.  See, e.g., Drakes v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 
2003).  Thus, former § 321, which was in effect when Wilson was born, when he turned 
eighteen, and when his mother naturalized, controls his claim for derivative citizenship.  
See, e.g., Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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derivative citizenship by operation of law and not by adjudication.  See In re Fuentes-
Martinez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 893, 896 (BIA 1997).  However, the agency did not base its 
determination in this case on the lack of a naturalization certification or passport.  Rather, 
as discussed above, the agency determined that Wilson did not acquire derivative 
citizenship by operation of law because he did not meet the legal requirements of former 
§ 321(a). 
 Finally, Wilson argues that this Court lacks the authority to adjudicate his 
citizenship claim, and should remand the matter to the District Court for resolution in the 
first instance.  Because this case does not present a genuine issue of material fact, we 
decline to do so.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) (“If the petitioner claims to be a national 
of the United States and the court of appeals finds from the pleadings and affidavits that 
no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court 
shall decide the nationality claim.”) 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
